The Mind of Theseus

There is a problem with consciousness: no one seems to know exactly what it is. In fact, some philosophers argue that there really isn't such a thing as consciousness, and the whole thing is actually a farce, an illusion created by the tendency of human brains to form models of understanding. This seems to follow from naturalism, physicalism, or material, and, though this begs the question of the value of creations of the mind (see the work of Alvin Plantinga), I can't blame philosophers of this school for being consistent in their beliefs. If the world is indeed completely physical, and we have no physical evidence of anything such as consciousness which is NOT physical, then there really is a problem in saying that consciousness exists the same way that protons exist, or that butter exists, or that stars exists. We cannot see consciousness, nor can we measure consciousness in anything other than in a physical means, and these physical means show that consciousness is simply a 'brain-wave' amongst many such brain-waves -- a type of neuronal firing that causes the human Turing machine to function at a certain rate, in a certain way -- a pattern of electrons coursing through a network of chemical structures that cause a sort of executive function that we call consciousness.

The implications of a physical mind on our understanding (if understanding has meaning in a mind which is simply chemical-electric structure) lead to radical notions of personal identity. The reason for this lies in the nature of the identity of physical structures.

As always, we tread the ground cleared by those men in togas, who, whilst presumably drinking Santorini, eating gyros, and living quite decadent lives in one of the most beautiful countries in the world, nevertheless found time to lay the groundwork for a system of rational thought that would work its way to the ends of the earth. The problem here to the Greeks was the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I'll give it a quick overview.

1. There was a ship called the Ship of Theseus.

2. As this ship rotted over time, the Athenians replaced the materials that failed

3. Eventually, not one original timber remained. The ship had been completely rebuilt.

4. The problem: Is this the same ship?

The resolutions, as all resolutions in philosophy are, are complex and varied. The easiest physicalist answer is that "There never was such thing as a 'Ship of Theseus.' The ship, being simply a collection of atoms, was by agreement of men granted a name. That name can apply as much as we want it to apply or not apply. What the 'Ship of Theseus' is is a pattern of neurons in a human brain roughly corresponding to a pattern of neurons in another human brain. There is no problem because there is no physical ship. In fact, the physicalist must adopt this answer for the fact that any answer which grants the existence of a 'Ship of Theseus' is sucked into the paradox.

If we adopt this view that identity is illusory for all physical objects, and we adopt the view that the mind or consciousness is a physical object, it logically follows that identity is illusory for consciousness. Descartes' 'Cogito' seemingly dies a painless death. In fact, it simply disintegrates into another fantasy conjured by the human Turing machine. It never really existed at all. Here is problem of identity with the Ship replaced by a more familiar being: you.

1. There was a human called 'you'.

2. As this human metabolized, it was replaced with fresh material.

3. Eventually, not one original atom remained. The human had been completely rebuilt.

4. The problem: Is this rebuilt human 'you'?

The physicalist answer which resolved the paradox by negating identity means that there is no 'you'. What was the physical 'you' that existed? Whatever it was, it must be gone, and, if there appears to still be a you, it is an imperfect copy of a phycial thing that existed in the past. This interpretation relies on the concept of identity over time, which David Lewis attempted to use to resolve the paradox of the ship of Theseus. Lewis' resolution (as presented by the great scholars at Wikipedia) is that identity cannot carry over time. The ship at each instance of time possessed a different identity. The identity of the Ship at 5:30 A.M., June 8th, 460 B.C., is different from the identity of the Ship at 5:31 A.M., June 8th, 460 B.C., and different still for each identity of the ship at each instance of time in between.

To me, the question that follows is: What is it, if not me, that has learned this information? What is it that has been experiencing the life of this human in a seemingly continuous manner. At each instance of conscious experience something did exist which experienced. Was it a string of 'yous', who, at each instance of time, enjoyed access to the full memories and experience of this electro-chemical automaton, utterly convinced by such circumstance that they had been and always will be this chemical automaton? This conflicts with our empirical experience. We experience ourselves as consistently us, and never anything else. It seems to this us that when we close our eyes and at once open them, that there we are, the same us, in the same body, in the same format as we always were. For better or worse, it seems the self is quite attached to these electrified meatbags. Identity appears to be empirically confirmed, and what does it mean if we reject this in favor of physicalist explanations of identity?

The problem of the empirical existence of identity strikes to the core of physicalist, naturalist, and materialist philosophies of mind. If our empirical observations of the world lead us to reject the existence of our own identity, which itself can be observed empirically, then empirical observation cannot be a trustworthy means of knowing truth, which calls into question the very things which caused us to reject identity. It seems the denial of our personal identity has more problematic implications than our denial of the identity of the Ship of Theseus. We lose the very basis of empiricism.

If the conjectures of empiricism undermine the basis of empiricism, then what is to be done? Must we abandon empiricism as a means to truth? I don't think so. I think that empirical observation must be couched in a transcendtal understanding which limits the conclusions of empiricism. What I mean by this is that when empirical thought reaches conclusions which appear to undermine itself, such as "consciousness is an illusion," or "identity does not exist", we must reject those conclusions and work backwards to find the root of our error in these claims. In the case of the Mind of Theseus, it seems the premise which must be rejected it physicalism, the metaphysical idea that the physical supeervenes all other observable categories.

You see, in the case of the Ship, there is no conflict in saying that the Ship doesn't exist. That identity cannot be empirically observed, only references to the identity can. These references may ultimately point to nothing exactly. Physical objects may not have anything more than transient or mental identities, formed on the basis of human brains. This applies to all physical objects, amongst which are the human bodies we empirically observe. We avoid the paradox.

In the case of the mind, the conflict is that its identity is empirical, and appears to be empirical even throughout time. If we grant that the identity is physical, we cannot avoid the paradox, and Lewis' solution to the paradox of the Ship cannot be a solution to the paradox of the Mind.

My solution to this paradox is the the mind simply cannot be physical. It must exist outside the transient state of atoms and energies, and thus outside the laws of physics. This resolves the paradox and preserves and reinforces the usefulness of empiricism and reason, which are otherwise under physical interpretations of the mind subject to extreme doubts, whereby the philosophy of the mind tend to undermine the very act of philosophizing.

I understand that this is on one hand utterly controversial, and on the other hand not at all controversial. This affords for consciousness a special place outside of the universe, violating a popular metaphysical principle for many scientists, yet, this is a granted for many schools of philosophy. If you are in the former camp, then I suggest you evaluate my arguments here and attempt to rebut the charge that a physical interpretation of the mind undermines identity, or deny that the identity of mind is empirically observed.

The properties of consciousness seem to contradict the properties of the physical, and ultimately, the only way to maintain the empirical worldview is to grant consciousness, that object which stands in the way of all empirical investigation, an identity which transcends the physical world.

Comments

I hope you enjoyed this little rambling on philosophy. As an amateur speaking outside of a formal setting, I use interchangeably some words which do not strictly mean the same thing, but which represent broad patterns of thought in philosophy. Feel free to get mad about that and correct me as you wish!